Shuttle diplomacy in the South China Sea
| Vikram Nehru ; The writer is A Senior Associate and Bakrie Chair in Southeast Asian Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |
JAKARTA POST, 30 Agustus 2012
Tensions in the South China Sea are ratcheting upward. China and the Southeast Asian nations with competing territorial claims seem set on a collision course. Though still low, the probability of conflict is rising inexorably.
At this point, the focus should not be on resolving the competing claims, but on lowering temperatures and getting all sides to implement confidence-building measures. Only when cooler heads prevail can the claimant countries turn their attention to resolving the longer-term question of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the disputed islands and adjacent waters, whether through negotiation, adjudication, or joint development.
The forty-year history of disputes in the South China Sea has seen a steady escalation in tension punctuated by occasional conflicts that have been quickly contained. Based on the vaguely defined “nine-dash line” (reduced from eleven dashes in 1953), China claims sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands and their adjacent seas in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). On the ASEAN side are Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam, which have more modest, but nevertheless competing, claims that overlap with each other and with China.
The latest escalation in friction started with a confrontation between China and the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal and international bids by China and Vietnam for oil exploration in areas of the South China Sea contested by the two. Efforts by the Philippines and Vietnam to get the support of their ASEAN counterparts at a recent ministerial meeting resulted in ASEAN’s inability to issue a communiqué for the first time in the organization’s 45-year history.
But thanks to shuttle diplomacy by Indonesia’s energetic Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa, ASEAN emerged with a face-saving “common position” that reiterated ASEAN’s adherence to the declaration of a code of conduct and UNCLOS. ASEAN’s joint communiqué, however, still hasn’t been issued.
Later, in response to Vietnam’s approval of a maritime law in June 2012 that declared sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Spratly and Paracel islands in the South China Sea, China raised the ante further by announcing steps to actively administer the disputed islands and the Macclesfield Bank, as well as 772,000 square miles of ocean within its “nine-dashed line.” Sansha, a 1.5-kilometer islet in a disputed part of the South China Sea, was declared a city and the Chinese authorities stationed a People’s Liberation Army garrison there to monitor, and if necessary defend, China’s claims over the area.
These developments merely heightened tensions and serve neither China’s broader strategic interests nor those of its Southeast Asian neighbors.
China’s recent actions in the South China Sea are likely to severely damage its ability to influence the region and the world on other more important issues. China already has few friends in the region. Unfortunately, its Southeast Asian neighbors do not see China’s actions matching its rhetoric.
By taking provocative actions in the South China Sea themselves, Vietnam and the Philippines are not altogether blameless. They don’t need reminding, however, that a confrontation with China is neither in their interests nor in those of Southeast Asia.
Finally, the growing risk of conflict is not in the interest of the global community, especially for countries that rely on peaceful passage through the South China Sea and notably those on the Pacific Rim. The global economy, already suffering from myriad challenges, cannot afford yet another layer of uncertainty.
Certainly, the potential costs of conflict for the region and the world far outweigh any potential economic benefits contained in the seabed of the South China Sea — much of which is unknown in any case. Rather than the availability of hydrocarbons and fisheries, the South China Sea dispute is now being increasingly driven by domestic public opinion that is fueled by military lobbies and strong nationalist sentiments.
Stepping back from the brink is in everyone’s interests. But this has to be done in a way that builds mutual trust and confidence. The escalating tit-for-tat dynamic between China and the two ASEAN claimants —Vietnam and the Philippines — must be reversed. It will involve a carefully choreographed unwinding of present positions in a way that satisfies their respective domestic constituencies.
Given his recent success at shuttle diplomacy, Marty could well be the man to thread this needle. He could shuttle between the three key claimant countries — China, Philippines and Vietnam — to broker a deal. Marty’s recently burnished credentials as a diplomat have earned him the confidence of both sides. Moreover, such an approach could satisfy Beijing’s reluctance to enter multilateral negotiations over the South China Sea while still arranging a collective stand-down.
But make no mistake, the real leadership and courage will need to come from the claimant countries themselves. Given the high stakes involved, let’s hope that such leadership is forthcoming. ●
At this point, the focus should not be on resolving the competing claims, but on lowering temperatures and getting all sides to implement confidence-building measures. Only when cooler heads prevail can the claimant countries turn their attention to resolving the longer-term question of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the disputed islands and adjacent waters, whether through negotiation, adjudication, or joint development.
The forty-year history of disputes in the South China Sea has seen a steady escalation in tension punctuated by occasional conflicts that have been quickly contained. Based on the vaguely defined “nine-dash line” (reduced from eleven dashes in 1953), China claims sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands and their adjacent seas in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). On the ASEAN side are Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam, which have more modest, but nevertheless competing, claims that overlap with each other and with China.
The latest escalation in friction started with a confrontation between China and the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal and international bids by China and Vietnam for oil exploration in areas of the South China Sea contested by the two. Efforts by the Philippines and Vietnam to get the support of their ASEAN counterparts at a recent ministerial meeting resulted in ASEAN’s inability to issue a communiqué for the first time in the organization’s 45-year history.
But thanks to shuttle diplomacy by Indonesia’s energetic Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa, ASEAN emerged with a face-saving “common position” that reiterated ASEAN’s adherence to the declaration of a code of conduct and UNCLOS. ASEAN’s joint communiqué, however, still hasn’t been issued.
Later, in response to Vietnam’s approval of a maritime law in June 2012 that declared sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Spratly and Paracel islands in the South China Sea, China raised the ante further by announcing steps to actively administer the disputed islands and the Macclesfield Bank, as well as 772,000 square miles of ocean within its “nine-dashed line.” Sansha, a 1.5-kilometer islet in a disputed part of the South China Sea, was declared a city and the Chinese authorities stationed a People’s Liberation Army garrison there to monitor, and if necessary defend, China’s claims over the area.
These developments merely heightened tensions and serve neither China’s broader strategic interests nor those of its Southeast Asian neighbors.
China’s recent actions in the South China Sea are likely to severely damage its ability to influence the region and the world on other more important issues. China already has few friends in the region. Unfortunately, its Southeast Asian neighbors do not see China’s actions matching its rhetoric.
By taking provocative actions in the South China Sea themselves, Vietnam and the Philippines are not altogether blameless. They don’t need reminding, however, that a confrontation with China is neither in their interests nor in those of Southeast Asia.
Finally, the growing risk of conflict is not in the interest of the global community, especially for countries that rely on peaceful passage through the South China Sea and notably those on the Pacific Rim. The global economy, already suffering from myriad challenges, cannot afford yet another layer of uncertainty.
Certainly, the potential costs of conflict for the region and the world far outweigh any potential economic benefits contained in the seabed of the South China Sea — much of which is unknown in any case. Rather than the availability of hydrocarbons and fisheries, the South China Sea dispute is now being increasingly driven by domestic public opinion that is fueled by military lobbies and strong nationalist sentiments.
Stepping back from the brink is in everyone’s interests. But this has to be done in a way that builds mutual trust and confidence. The escalating tit-for-tat dynamic between China and the two ASEAN claimants —Vietnam and the Philippines — must be reversed. It will involve a carefully choreographed unwinding of present positions in a way that satisfies their respective domestic constituencies.
Given his recent success at shuttle diplomacy, Marty could well be the man to thread this needle. He could shuttle between the three key claimant countries — China, Philippines and Vietnam — to broker a deal. Marty’s recently burnished credentials as a diplomat have earned him the confidence of both sides. Moreover, such an approach could satisfy Beijing’s reluctance to enter multilateral negotiations over the South China Sea while still arranging a collective stand-down.
But make no mistake, the real leadership and courage will need to come from the claimant countries themselves. Given the high stakes involved, let’s hope that such leadership is forthcoming. ●