A problem of religion and the state
in the Sampang tragedy
| Tobias Basuki ; A Graduate of Northern Illinois University, A Lecturer at Pelita Harapan University, Tangerang |
JAKARTA POST, 29 Agustus 2012
The country’s top officials have finally paid attention to the brutal attack on the Shia community in Sampang, East Java, which not only claimed two lives and damaged dozens of houses, but has also forced hundreds of people to live in fear.
Sadly, however, when it comes to trying to understand why the attack was not prevented, buck-passing and finger-pointing ensues.
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono faulted the intelligence agencies for their failure to anticipate the assault, the chairman of House Commission III overseeing legal affairs I Gede Pasek Suardika lamented the police’s inability to prevent the violence, while Coordinating Political, Legal and Security Affairs Minister Djoko Suyanto defended the police and cast responsibility on local public figures and the ulema, for failing to soothe and enlighten their followers and constituents. It will come as no surprise if the victims themselves are eventually blamed, as has been the case in the past.
Worse still, deputy chairman of the Commission III, Nasir Djamil, speculated on a conspiracy behind the violence against Shia followers. The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) politician said he suspected “foreign scenarios” of disrupting the religious harmony in Indonesia.
Perhaps only aliens and supernatural powers are the ones still left to blame.
Every government official and politician added their perfunctory condemnation of the violence against the Shiites, including Religious Affairs Minister Suryadharma Ali, who in January, right after the first Sampang attacks, publicly stated that Shia beliefs “are heretical and against Islam”.
While every politician denounced the attacks, who or what is really to blame?
The most obvious and commonly cited problem is poor law enforcement, but the cause is something much deeper and wider than that. At the local judiciary level, we have witnessed unfair and preposterous rulings in cases of religious violence.
It needs to be highlighted that the violence in Sampang is something that has been going on with impunity for a while. This is not the first time that Nangkernang village has come under attack.
On Dec. 29, 2011, a mob ransacked the village and burned down the house and pesantren (Islamic boarding school) of Tajul Muluk, the leader of the Shia community there. Ironically, the Sampang District Court sentenced him to two years’ imprisonment for blasphemy, while only one perpetrator of the attack was convicted, and was jailed for less than three months.
This kind of absurdity is not new. One should not forget the ruthless killing of three Ahmadiyah members at Cikeusik, Banten in February 2011. Each of the killers were only sentenced to between three to six months’ imprisonment, while Deden Sudjana, the Ahmadiyah security coordinator and primary victim who almost lost his hand, was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment for incitement.
The government’s response has generally been weak against perpetrators who commit violence under the pretext of religious values and beliefs.
The finger-pointing illustrated above indicates a shared responsibility of all. A common thread linking them is the conceptual confusion of the relationship between religion and the state, by the administration and politicians alike.
There are violations of principles differentiating the sphere of religion and the state with regard to democracy in Indonesia.
One indicator is the continued existence of the 1965 Blasphemy Law. The law is not a framework guaranteeing religious harmony, as espoused by its proponents.
On the contrary, it evidently creates more victims instead of preventing conflict. It not only became a tool to legally punish those considered “heretic”, as in the case of Tajul Muluk and Deden Sudjana.
Moreover, the radical groups consider it a source of political and legal justification to attack individuals and groups they deem “blasphemous”.
This is a clear violation of the proper role and sphere of the state in a democratic system. The state should not interfere and adjudicate matters of religion in the form of legislation or statements by officials of the state.
The second violation is in the religious sphere. The Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) is increasingly becoming entrenched in matters of the state. Although it has no legal powers, its role and perception as an extension of the state is very problematic.
MUI is often considered the highest authority on Islam in the country. Although not endorsed by the central branch, the fatwa (edict) of the East Java branch of the MUI, which asserted in May that the Shia was heretical, definitely had much traction in the region.
These two examples of violations of each sphere of the state and of religion are the foundations for both the lax response of the government, and also the catalyst bolstering mob violence under the pretext of religion.
The existence of the blasphemy law, and personal statements by state officials such as Suryadharma, give political legal weight to the casting of the Ahmadiyah and Shia victims as “criminals”. This in turn creates the illusion and reinforces the feeling held by the radical mobs that they are also “enforcers of the law”.
The East Java MUI fatwa of local religious leaders bequeaths spiritual legal credence to these vicious acts. Law enforcement agencies and officials hesitate to act against “spiritual and divine” edicts, and this further justifies their failure in enforcing and protecting the rights of the victims.
The President’s reaction is laudable. We certainly hope that the overdue response will ensure some concrete results.
Beyond an immediate practical solution to the violence in Sampang, there also needs to be a deeper overhaul in the conceptual understanding of the proper role of religion and the state by our public servants. ●
Sadly, however, when it comes to trying to understand why the attack was not prevented, buck-passing and finger-pointing ensues.
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono faulted the intelligence agencies for their failure to anticipate the assault, the chairman of House Commission III overseeing legal affairs I Gede Pasek Suardika lamented the police’s inability to prevent the violence, while Coordinating Political, Legal and Security Affairs Minister Djoko Suyanto defended the police and cast responsibility on local public figures and the ulema, for failing to soothe and enlighten their followers and constituents. It will come as no surprise if the victims themselves are eventually blamed, as has been the case in the past.
Worse still, deputy chairman of the Commission III, Nasir Djamil, speculated on a conspiracy behind the violence against Shia followers. The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) politician said he suspected “foreign scenarios” of disrupting the religious harmony in Indonesia.
Perhaps only aliens and supernatural powers are the ones still left to blame.
Every government official and politician added their perfunctory condemnation of the violence against the Shiites, including Religious Affairs Minister Suryadharma Ali, who in January, right after the first Sampang attacks, publicly stated that Shia beliefs “are heretical and against Islam”.
While every politician denounced the attacks, who or what is really to blame?
The most obvious and commonly cited problem is poor law enforcement, but the cause is something much deeper and wider than that. At the local judiciary level, we have witnessed unfair and preposterous rulings in cases of religious violence.
It needs to be highlighted that the violence in Sampang is something that has been going on with impunity for a while. This is not the first time that Nangkernang village has come under attack.
On Dec. 29, 2011, a mob ransacked the village and burned down the house and pesantren (Islamic boarding school) of Tajul Muluk, the leader of the Shia community there. Ironically, the Sampang District Court sentenced him to two years’ imprisonment for blasphemy, while only one perpetrator of the attack was convicted, and was jailed for less than three months.
This kind of absurdity is not new. One should not forget the ruthless killing of three Ahmadiyah members at Cikeusik, Banten in February 2011. Each of the killers were only sentenced to between three to six months’ imprisonment, while Deden Sudjana, the Ahmadiyah security coordinator and primary victim who almost lost his hand, was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment for incitement.
The government’s response has generally been weak against perpetrators who commit violence under the pretext of religious values and beliefs.
The finger-pointing illustrated above indicates a shared responsibility of all. A common thread linking them is the conceptual confusion of the relationship between religion and the state, by the administration and politicians alike.
There are violations of principles differentiating the sphere of religion and the state with regard to democracy in Indonesia.
One indicator is the continued existence of the 1965 Blasphemy Law. The law is not a framework guaranteeing religious harmony, as espoused by its proponents.
On the contrary, it evidently creates more victims instead of preventing conflict. It not only became a tool to legally punish those considered “heretic”, as in the case of Tajul Muluk and Deden Sudjana.
Moreover, the radical groups consider it a source of political and legal justification to attack individuals and groups they deem “blasphemous”.
This is a clear violation of the proper role and sphere of the state in a democratic system. The state should not interfere and adjudicate matters of religion in the form of legislation or statements by officials of the state.
The second violation is in the religious sphere. The Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) is increasingly becoming entrenched in matters of the state. Although it has no legal powers, its role and perception as an extension of the state is very problematic.
MUI is often considered the highest authority on Islam in the country. Although not endorsed by the central branch, the fatwa (edict) of the East Java branch of the MUI, which asserted in May that the Shia was heretical, definitely had much traction in the region.
These two examples of violations of each sphere of the state and of religion are the foundations for both the lax response of the government, and also the catalyst bolstering mob violence under the pretext of religion.
The existence of the blasphemy law, and personal statements by state officials such as Suryadharma, give political legal weight to the casting of the Ahmadiyah and Shia victims as “criminals”. This in turn creates the illusion and reinforces the feeling held by the radical mobs that they are also “enforcers of the law”.
The East Java MUI fatwa of local religious leaders bequeaths spiritual legal credence to these vicious acts. Law enforcement agencies and officials hesitate to act against “spiritual and divine” edicts, and this further justifies their failure in enforcing and protecting the rights of the victims.
The President’s reaction is laudable. We certainly hope that the overdue response will ensure some concrete results.
Beyond an immediate practical solution to the violence in Sampang, there also needs to be a deeper overhaul in the conceptual understanding of the proper role of religion and the state by our public servants. ●